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The power of a municipal corporation to borrow money is entirely distinct from
those powers bestowed upon it for public purposes, and pertaining to its functions
as a local government, exercising a part of the soveeignty of the state.
In the exercise of a power to borrow money, a municipal corporation, quoad hoc,
is to be treated as a private person or an ordinary trading corporation, and will be
heid to the same degree of responsibility for the acts of its officers and agents.
Where a city issues its registered bonds, and invites the public to deal upon the
faith of them as the ultimate evidence of title, it cannot be heard to gainsay their
validity in the hands of a bondfide bolder, although in the issuing of the bonds the
agents of the city violated their instructions.
Therefore, the city of Richmond was estopped to deny the validity of a registered
bond regularly transferred and in the hands of a bond fide purchaser, even though
such bond was issued by its transfer officer in disregard of instructions to make a
certain recital on the face of the bond, which if made would have notified the purchaser of the facts creating the alleged invalidity, and this because, by its ordinances,
the city had declared that the delivery of a registered bond, with a power of transfer,
should operate jo pass the complete title, both at law and in equity, to a bond fide
purchaser; saving, that all payments by the city to the registered owner should be
deemed valid.

THIS was an appeal froma a decree of the Circuit Court of
Richmond, in Equity.
In 1862, Asa Otis, a citizen of Maissachusetts, was the owner
of a registered bond of the city of Richmond for $2300. By a
decree -of a court commissioned by the Confederate government,
the title to.this bond was confiscated, and the city of Richmond
issued a new bond" to "Henry S. Brooke, receiver. ' Under an
ordinance of Richmond, it was the duty of the auditor, in issuing
such a new bond, and in all future transfers of it,' to recite on its
face that it was issued in obedience to a decree of the court, and
on account of certain other 'bonds confiscated by the decree.
This was done on the bond issued to Brooke.
In October 1862, -the bond to Brooke was 'surrendered' and
a new one issued to defendants Maury & Co., -and in -FebrUary 1863, this in turn was surrendered and a new one issued to
defendant De, Voss,- In both of these last cases, however, the
auditor inadvertently omitted to recite that the bonds representod
an original .that had been confiscated; and the transactions having
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been through a broker, neither Maury & Co. nor De Voss had
actual notice of that fact.
The power of the city of Richmond to borrow money and issue
evidences of indebtedness therefor, is unlimited. The city declined to recognise De Voss as a creditor, and filed a bill in the
Circuit Court against lDe Voss, Maury & Co., and Otis, setting
foith the facts, and praying that the bond to De Voss might be
decreed void and surrendered for cancellation. It was conceded
throughout that the decree of forfeiture as to Otis was utterly void.
The Circuit Court, MEREDITH, J., decreed the bond void, and
ordered it to be surrendered. From this decree the present appeal
was taken.

James Alfred Jones, for De Voss.
Page

Maury, for Maury & do.

B. T. Daniel, for the City of Richmond.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
JOYN ES, J. (after stating certain points that the court had not
felt called upon to consider).-I shall assume, for the purposes
of the case, as was assumed in the argument, that the decree of
confiscation, and the proceedings under it, did not affect the title
of Otis to claim payment of the bond held by him, or, of themselves, give validity to the bond held by De Voss. And besides,
it would not be competent to consider. thi effect of that decree as
between the city and Oils, because no such question has been
raised in the pleadings. Whatever may be the rights of De Vos&,
the city is not at liberty, on the present pleadings, to controvert
the title of Otis.
It is conceded that the bond held by De VQs was executed
and issued to him by the officers of the city to whom was intrusted,
by its laws, the general duty of executing and issuing bonds.
In the argument for the appellants, these officers were treated as
the agents of the city, and the general principles of the law of
agency were regarded as applying to the city in respect to the
acts and functions of such officers, in like manner as to other
corporations and their officers and servants.
For the appellee it was contended, that the functions of these
officers, in reference to the execution, transfer, and renewal of

.DE VOSS v. CITY OF RICHMOND.

bonds of the- city, pertain to the, execution by the city of the
powers and duties devolved upon it in the character of a local
government, and that the city cannot -be held liable for their
misfeasance or negligence in the discharge of their functibns,
according to the principles on which this court proceeded in
U'ty of Richmond v. Long'8 Adm'r., 17 Gratt. Rep. 375.
But that princilple has no application to this case. The power
which was in question in the case referred to, was one of those
conferred upon the city for public purposes only, and pertained
to its character as-a local government. It was n'ot conferred with
any view to the private advantage or emolument of the city. But
the power to borrow money is bestowed primarily for the advantage and benefit of the city. It has no direct relation to the
powers and: duties of the city as a local government. It may be
exercised, in a particular case, with a view to the better execution'of those' powers and duties, but it is not essential'to their
execution. -It involves no exercise of sovereign power over the
persons or property of the citizens, but is such a power as may
b exercised by a private individual, or by an ordinay trading
or commercial corporation. ' Such a power is enti.ely distinct, in
cpntemplation of law, from those which are bestowed upon the
city for public purloses only, and pertain .io its fuuictionsas a
local government, exercising, for that purpose, a portion of the
sovereign power of the state.' The'city is quoad hoe a private
corporation. This distinction is talen by Sir LiOYD KENYON,
Master of the Rolls, in Moodaly v. East India Co., I Brown 0.
C. 469. The plaintiff had taken a lease from the- company,
granting him permission to supply the inhabitants of Madras with
tobacco for ten years.- Before the term was out the company
dispossessed the plaintiff, and granted the privilege to another.
The plaintiff filed a bill of discovery, with a view to bringing an
action against the company. It was objected, on behalf of the
defendants, that the act complained of was incident to their
character a*s a sovereign power, and coult4 not be made the subject of a suit. His Honor admitted that no suit'would lie against
a sovereign power for anything done in that capacity; but he heta
that the defendants, in thai case, did not come within the rule.
He said, "They have rights as a. sovereign power; they have
also duties as individuals. If they enter-into bonds in India, the
sums secured may be recovered here. So in this case, as a
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private company, they have entered into 4 private contract to
which they must be liable."
The power to borrow money is of course a discretionary power,
to be exercised or not at the pleasure of the city, and in such
manner as it may see fit. But when' the city, through its proper
authorities, has determined to exercise this power, and has prescribed how the bonds shall be executed, how they shall be
transferred, and ho* new bonds shall be issued to the assignees,
duties devolve upon the city.which'are absolute and purely ministerial. The holder of a bond has a' right to transfer it. The
city is bound to allow 'the, transfer, to make the proper registry,
anid to issue a new bond to the .assignee. For a refusal to per.
form these duties, an action will lie against the city, though perhaps the performance of them cannot be enforced by mandamus:
Angell & Ames' on Corp., §§ 384, 710. The city may, and indeed
must, from the necessity of the case, confide the performance of'
these duties to officers and agents, but they perform them in the
place and stead of the city ; their acts in the execution of these
duties- are the acts of the city. They are the mere agents and
servants of the city, and in such a case the maxim respondeat
superior applies: Sawyer v. Corse, 17 Gratt. Rep. 230. See
Bailey v. Mayor, &e., of New York, 3 Hill Rep. 531 ; City of
Dayton v: Pease, 4 Ohio N. S. Rep. 80 ; Clark v. Mayoi,-&c.,
of Washingtan, 12 Wheat Rep. 40; Thayer v. Boston, 19 Pick..
Rep. 511; TWeightman v. Corporation of Washingtov, '1 Black
Rep. 89; Conrad v. lthaea, 16 N. Y. Rep. 158.
It was contended for the appellee, that De Voss must be taken
to have.had notice of the character and history of the bond issued
to him. It is not pretended that he had actual notice, and it is.
very clear that he did not have such notice. But he purchased
the bond from R. H. Maury & Co., by whom it-was transferred
to him in February 1863, and it was transferred to them in October 1862, by H. S. Brooke, receiver under the decree of con
fiscation. From this it is argued, De Voss must be charged with
constructive notice of the character of the bond, which he might
have ascertained if he had traced it back through the books of
the auditor.
But I do not think so. The bond delivered
to De Voss by Maury & Co. was perfectly regular on its
face. De Voss had no reason to suspect that it was a bond issued
in lieu of one that had been confiscated. but he had the best
'

DE VOSS v. CITY OF RICHMOND.

reason to believe the contrary. For 1, The bond did not contain
the statement which such bonds were required to contain by the
resolution of the council; and 2, Maury & Co. knew that DO
Voss would not purchase such bonds, and their delivery of -this
bond to him was an assurance that it did not belong to that class.
It does not appear that he ever saw the bond which Maury & Co.
held; but if he had seen it, that too was regular on its face.
There was nothing, therefore, to excite his suspicion or to put him
on inquiry. All that can be said is, that he might have ascertained the fact if. he had gone to the auditor's office,' and traced
the bond back to its source. But that is not enough to charge
him with constructive notice of what he might thus have ascertained, in the absence of anything to put him on inquiry: 2 Rob.
P r. 29; Opinion of CABELL, J., in French v. Loyal Co., 5 Leigh
Rep. 627. And according to the recent cases in ,ngland, a
party will not be charged with constructive notice unless the circumstances are iuch that the court can say, that it was his duty
to acquire the knowledge in question, and that his failure to obtain
it was the result of culpable negligence ; it is not enough that he
should, from a want of prudent caution, have neglected to make
inquiries, but he must have designedly abstaiied from such
inquiries for the purpose of avoiding.knowledge; there must be awilful blindness, and not mere want of caution: "Jonesv.. Smith,
1 Hare Rep. 55; s. c. on appeal, 1 Phillips Rep. 244; Ware v.
Lord -Egmont, 81 Eng. L. & .Eq. Rep. 89. It was argued "that
De Voss claims under assignment from Maury, and that it was
his duty to look to Matiry's title, by tracing the bond back through
the previous transfers. This, however, is not the title which
De Voss holds. .He holds a new bond given directly to himself.
The natute of this title will be more fully considered hereafter.
The validity of the bond held by De Voss is controverted on
the ground, that* the officers of- the, city by whom it was issued
exceeded their authority in doing so. This objection is founded
on the resolution of the council passed April 14th 1862. This
resolution directed, 1, That bonds of the 6ity should be*issued to
H. S. Brooke, receiver, in obedience to the decree of confiscation;
and 2, in substance that it should -be stated on the face of such
bonds, and also on the face of all others that might be given in
place of them, in case of transferthat they were issued in place
of bonds which had been confiscated. The object of this last
VoL. XVf.-38
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provision was to give notice to purchasers of this class of bonds,
so that they should cease to be binding on the city in case the
decree of confiscation should be overthrown by the event of
the war.
It is undoubtedly true that it was the intention of the council
that no bond, in lieu of a confiscated bond, should be issued, in
any case, without the special statement on its face required by
the resolution. The. prohibition is as plain, as if the language
of the resolution had been in the form of express prohibition. As
.between the city and the officers, therefore, it limited, in respect
to this class of bonds, the authority of the officers.
-But the authority of these officers to transfer bonds and to issue.
new ones, was not derived from this resolution.. They had a
general authority'for these purposes, conferred by the ordinance.
They had long been. in the habit, also, of making such transfers
and renewals, from which the public might have inferred a gen-"
eral authority to do so. This resolution; with a view to the
protection of the city, directed the officers not to exercise their
authority in respect to this particular class of bonds, except in a
particular way. The officers were relied upon to observe this
direction, and it does not appear in the record that the resolution
was ever communicated to the public. There appears to be
strong ground, therefore, to say, as was contended by the counsel
for the appellants, that, in respect to the public, this resolution
did hot operate as a .limitation of .the apparent power of the
officers, which remained the same as before, but was only in the
nature of private instruction as to the manner in which they
should execute their authority in particular cases. If so, it -is
clear that the act of the officers in issuing the bond to De Voss,
in conformity with their apparent authority, was not vitiated by
their omission to observe the direction contained in the resolution. But under the ordinance the officers had no authority to
issue a new bond without the surrender of the old one, except in
the case of a lost bond. The power to make the first issue of
bonds in place of those which had been confiscated, was derived,
therefore, from this resolution alone. It was conferred on special
terms in this, that the bonds were to be in a particular form,
which was prescribed for an important purpose. Every bond that
might be issued in place of these was also to have the same forn.
In this view it may be contended, that this resolution had the
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effect, in respect to this class of bonds, of taking away from the
officers the general power which they before had, and of substituting for it a new and limited authority, of which the public"
must take notice. I do not think it worth while to discuss this
question, and will assume, for the purpose of the argument, that
the view just stated is a sound one.
Assuming that the officers had thus only a limited authority,
of the extent of which the public were bound to take notice, in
respect to the renewal of this class of bonds, the counsel for the
appellee contended that the bond held by De Voss, which was not
issued in conformity with this authority, cannot be held binding
on the city. The counsel for the appellants 'contended, on the
other hand, that the city cannot be allowed.to avail itself of this
defence against De Voss, who took the bond issued to him without a knowledge of the fact that the officers exceeded their
authority inissuing it. And I think this position may 1e main.
tained on principle and authority.
The city of Richmond is authorized by its charter to contract
loans without limit as to ampunt, and to issue bonds or certificates
of debt for the money borrowed. It provided by anordinance,
which is a transcript of a law of the state -(Code of 1860, p. 264),
for the execution, transfer, and renewal of these bonds or certificates. They are to be under seal, to be registered in the office
of the auditor, and to be subscribed by -the 'President of .the
council and the Chamberlain. Upon the surrender of a certificate at the office in which it is registered, a transfer may be
made of the whole amount, or any part thereof, by"the personappearing'bn the books to be the owner, or by another having a
power of attorney from'him to make the transfer. When a transfer
is made, the old certificate is to be cancelled and filed in the
office of the Chamberlain, and -one or more new certificates issued.
New certificates may be obtained by a holder, on application, in
the place of an old one, when there has been no transfer. Every
new certificate is to be registered, signed; and countersignea like
the former one. When a certificate has been lost, the holder
may obtain a new one on affidavit and three m6nths' advertisement of the loss, and upon giving bond and security to indemnify
all persons against any loss by reason of issuing the new certificate. The same ordinance also provides, that the person appearing on the books of the office in which any Certificate is registered
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as the owner thereof, shall be deemed the owner as regards te
city, so as to make valid all payments to him on account thereof,
made before a transfer o'f the certificate on the books of the office.
But if the person so appearing on the books as owner, shall, bond
fide and for valuable consideration, sell, pledge, or otherwise dispose of a certificate to another, and deliver to him the certificate
with power of attorney authorizing the transfer thereof on the
books of the proper 6ffice, the title of the former to said certificate
(both at law and in equity) shall vest in the latter, for the whole
-amount of the certificate, or so much thereof as may be necessary
to effect the purpose of the sale, pledge, or other disposition ; and
it shall so vest, not only as between the parties themselves, but
also as against the creditors of, and subsequent purchasers from
the former, subject to the last preceding'provision in respect to
payments by the city.
Under these arrangements the bonds of the city were put upon
the market. It is manifest that a leading object contemplated
by these arrangements, was to give security to the title of holders
of the -bonds, and thus to promote their credit. If the bonds had
been made so as to pass by assignment merely, each successive
assignee would have taken only an equitable title, and the bonds
in his hands would have been subject to the same defences to
which they would have been subject in the hands of any prior
holder. It 'is provided, however, that upon each successive
transfer a new bond shall be issued in the name of the transferee,
which will give him a legal title to defmand payment of the money.
See Union Bank v. Laird, 2 Wheat. Rep. 890; Black et al. v.
Zacharie & Co., 8 Howard Rep. 483 ; Fisheret al. v. Essex Bank,
5 Grgy Rep. 873. So an assignee for value who receives a bond
from the holder, with a power of attorney to transfer it, acquires,
under the ordinance, the legal title of the holder before a transfer
on the books; subject only to the right of the city to make pay.
ment to the registered owner. The new certificate, or the deli.
very of an old certificate, with a power of attorney to transfer it,
will cut off all defences which the city might have against any
prior holder. For the question whether the holder of an obligation for the payment of money is subject to the defences of tht.
debtor against a prior holder, depends, in the absence of notice or
fraud, upon the character of his title, as legal or equitable. If it
is an ordinary chose in action, and therefore only assignable in
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equity, it is subject to all the rights, legal and equitable, which
the debtor bad against a former holder. For while a court of
equity will sustain the rights of the assignee, it will also sustain
the rights of the debtor existing before notice of the assignnient;
and these, being prior in time to those of the assignee, prevail
ower them. But where the assignee takes thfe legal title, without
fraud or notice,, this principle does not apply; the title of the
holder is absolute, and all defences of the debtor against prior
holders are cut off.
The bond fide holder of a bond issued to him-stands, therefore,
iii this respect, in the position of the holder of a bill of exchange
or negotiable note. This is conclusive to show that he is not
bound to look behind the bond. The city cannot deny the title
of the registered owner, who still holds his bond. Any other.
principle would lead to embarrassment and inconvenience, -ndgreatly impair .the credit of the bonds. To require a holder to
investigate the previous history of his bond, he must examine the
books ,in the auditor's office and the files in the chamberlain's
d6fice, which are not open to public inspection. It would often
be impossible for him to trace the history of his, bond from the
union, under one name, of a number of bonds bought from different
persons. On the other hand, it is the duty of the officers of the
city to make every necessary investigation, at each successive
transfer, and they have all the means of doing so.
It is of the very nature of such a bond, and the very object' for
which it is issued, that it shall furnish authentic and conclusiveevidence of the holder's title to demand the money-it calls for.
Such is the general understanding upon which such bonds and
stocks are bought and sold in the market, and any other principle
would be fatal to the credit of such securities. . In .Davisv. Bank
of -ngland, 2 Bing. Rep. 393 (9 Eng. C. L. Rep. 444), when the
bank had permitted certain stock in the public funds standing on
the "books of the bank to be transferred under~a forged power of
attorney, the Court of Common Pleas said: "We are not called
on to decide whether. those who purchase the stock transferied to
them under the forged power, might require the bank. to. confilm
that purchase to them, and to pay them the dividends on such
stocks, or whether their neglect to inquire into the authenticity
of the power of attorney might not throw the loss on them, that
has been occasioned by the forgeries. But to prevent, as far ar
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we can, the alarm which an argument urged on behalf of the'bank
is likely to excite, we will say, that the bank cannot refuse to pay
the dividends to subsequent purchasers of these stocks. If the
bank should say to such subsequent purchasers, the persons of
whom you bought were not legally possessed of the stocks they
sold you, the answer would be, the bank, in the books which the
law requires them to keep, and for keeping*which they receive a
remuneration from .the public, have registered these persons as
the owners of these stocks, and the bank cannot be permitted to
say that such persons were not the pwners. . If this be not the
law, who will purchase stock, or who can be certain that the stock
which he holds belongs to him? It has ever been the object of
the legislature to give facility to the transfer of shares* in the
public funds. This facility of transfer is one of the advantages
belonging to this species of -property, and this advantage would
be entirely destroyed if a purchaser should be required to look to
the regularity of the transfer to all the various persons through
whom such stock had passed. Indeed, from the manner in which
stock .passes from man to man, from the union of stocks bought
of different persons under the same name, and the impossibility
of distinguishing what was regularly transferred from what was
not, it is impossible to trace the title of stock as you can that of
an estate. You cannot look further, nor is it the practice.even
to attempt to. look further, than the bank books for the title of
the -person who proposes to transfer to you." In conformity with
these views, it was field in Bank of Kentucky v. Schuylkill
Bank, 1 Parsons' Sel. Cas. 180, in reference to spurious stock
issued by an agent of the bank, and transferred, from time. to
time, to innocent purchasers, that against bond fide holders of
such stock, the bank would be estopped from going beyond its
last certificate, in any question between the bank and such holder
touching the obligatory force of such certificate on the corporation, p. 250. To the same effect is the opinion of RmDIELD, J..
in Sabin v. Bank of Woodstock, 21 Verm. Rep. 358; cited with
approbation in Fisherv. Essex Bank, 5 Gray Rep. 873.
The common course of business in the sale and purchase of
such bonds, shows that such is the general understanding as to the
character and effect of the bond. A party having a bond to sell
delivers it to a broker, with a power of attorney authorizing an
the name of the transferee being
attorney to transfer it to -,
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left blank. When a purchaser is found, the blank is filled with
his name, the transfer is made in the books, and, a new bond issues
to the purchaser. The purchaser takes' the bond, but he seldom
knows, and never cares, who held the previous bond.
There is nothing unreasonable or harsh in holding the city to
be estopped from disputing the title of De Voss. On the contrary, it is highly just and reasonable. The city appointed
officers to issue its bonds in whom it confided. It knew that its
bonds were the subject of daily traffic in and out of Richmond.
From the nature of the business, it must have expected and intended the public to confide in their officers. There were two
classes of bonds to be issued, and the class to which each bond
belofiged was to be indicated by its form. The officers were
specially intrusted by the city with that duty; they had the
means of knowing the first in every case, and could not make a
mistake witliout gross negligence. These 'meanswere not equally
open to the public.
Under these circumstances it was natural that.purchasers should
presume that the officers did their duty. They had a right to
rely on such a presumption in their dealings.
. Indeed it was necessary, for them to. do so,'and it would be
unjust to allow the city to say to them, when they dealt in good
faith, that they ought not tohave relied on it.
The case of Ile _Boyal British Bank v. Turquand, 5 El. & BL
Rep. 248 (83 E. C. L. R.), was an acion against the offcial
manager of a railway company (that being the mode of suing the
company), upon a bond for 20001., payable to the plaintiff, and
signed by two directors, under the seal of the company.
There was a plea setting out a clause in the deed of settlement
of the company, which provided that the company might borrow
on bond, such sums as should, from time to time, by a general
resolution of the company, be allowed to be borrowed, and averring that there was no such resolution authorizing the making of
this bond. The Court of Queen's Benchheld the plea to bL'bad.
The judgment was affirmed in the Exchequer Chamber, 6 El. &
Bl. Rep. 327 (88 E. C L. R.). JERvis, C. J., delivering tlhe
opinion of the whole court, said: "We may now take for granted
that the dealings with these companies are not like dealings with
other partnerships, and that the parties dealing with them are
bound to read the statute and the deed of-settlement. But they
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are not pound to do more. And the 'party here, on reading the
deed of settlement, would find, not a prohibition from borrowing,
but a permission to do so, on certain conditions. Finding that the
authority might be made complete by a resolution,. he would have
a right to infer the fact of a resolution authorizing that which, on
the face of the documents, appeared to be legitimately done."
In the case of The Prince of W'ale8 Co. v. Harding, E. B. &
E. 183 (96 E. C. L.'R.), which was an action against the official
manager of the Atheneum Assurance Company upon a policy, the
deed of settlement provided (sect. 20) that the common seal
should not be affixed to -any policy except by the order of three
directors, signed by them and countersigned by the manager, and
that (sect. 28) every policy should be given under the hands of
not less than three directors, and sealed-with the common seal.
The policy in question was sealed with the common seal and signed
by three directors, one, of whom was manager, but there was no"
previous order made, as required by the. 20ih section. The case
was elaborately arguied by the most eminent counsel. It was contended. for the defendant that the previous order required by the
20th section, was a condition precedent to the power of the
directors to affix the seal to the policy, that the directorg were
agents with limited authority, that those who contracted with
them had -notice of the limits, because the statute conferredc the
authority, subject to the provisions of the act and of the deed of
settlement which was registered for public inspection, and that the
shareholders, as the principals, had a -right to rppudiate every
policy not executed in pursuance of the -uthority given to the
directors. The Court of Queen's Bench, in an elaborate judgment, overruled this argument, and held that the policy was binding on the company.
It was held that a person receiving a policy in good faith had a
right to presume that the directors who signed it had done their
duty, and that they had the preliminary order for executing it.
The case of The Boyqal Bank v. Turquand was cited with
approval by the Supreme Court in Commissioners of 'Knox
County v. Aspinwall, 21 How. Rep. 539. The board of commissioners of a county were authorized by statute to subscribe for
railroad stock and to issue bonds of the county therefor, in case a
majority of the voters of the county should so determine, after a
certain notice should be given of the time -and place of election.
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The board subscribed for the stock and issued the bonds, purporting to act in compliance with the statute. The required notice
was not given, and it was contended that, consequently, the power
to issue the bonds was never vested in the board. It was conceded by the court that every person dealing in the bonds was
chargeable with a knowledge of the statute under which they
were issued, and that as the board was acting under delegated
authority, he must show that the authority was properly conferred.
But it was held, 1. That as the bonds imported. on their face a
compliance with the law under which they were issued, the purchaser was not bound to look further for evidence of a compliance
with the conditions to the grant of the power. "The purchaser
of the bonds had-a right to assume that the vote of the county,
which was made a condition of the grant of the power, had been
obtained, from the .fact of the subscription by the board to'the
stock of the' railroad company, and the issuing of the bonds."
2. That upon the true construction of the statute, the board were
the proper judges whether a majority of the votes in the county
Had been cast in favor of the subscription. The court said: "The
right of the .board to act in an execution of the authority is placed
upon the fact that a majority of the votes. had ben cast in favor
of the .subscription, and to have acted without, ascertaining it,
would have been a clear violation of duty, and the ascertainment
of the fact was necessarily left to the inquiry and judgment of the
board itself, as no other tribunal was provided for the purpose.
The board was one, from its organization and general duties, fit
and competent to be the depository of the trust thus confided, to
it." "We, do not .say that the- decision of 1he board would be
conclusive in a direct proceeding to inquire into the facts - previously to the execution of the power and Lefore the rights and
interests of third parties had atached ; but after the authority had
been executed, the stock subscribed, and the bonds issued and in
the hands of innocent holders, it would be too late, even in a
direct proceeding, to call it in question." .
This case has been, followed in several subsequent cases in the
*same court, the latest of which is Supervisors v. ?chene7,.5 Wall.
Rep. 772, decided iii 1867. In all these cases, thb bonds in
question were payable to bearer and passed by delivery. That
circumstance was not expressly made a ground of decision in the
case of The Commissioners of .Knox County v. Aspinwal, which
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proceeded on the principle of the case of IBoyal Bank v. Tur.
quand, where this instrument was a common bond payable to the
plaintiff. In the case in 5 Wallace the opinion, referring to the
previous cases, says: "When a corporation has power, under any
circumstances, to issue negotiable securities, the decision of this
court is, that the bond fide holder has a right to presume they
were issued under the circumstances which give the requisite
authority, and they -are no more liable to be impeached in the
hands of such a holder than any other commercial paper."
- This ground of decision is equally.applicable to the present
case. For as we have already seen, the person to whom a bond
of the city of Richmond is issued, and who takes it in good faith,
takes a legal title, and is no more subject to defences which might
be made against a former holder, than he would be if he was the
holder of negotiable paper.
It was part of the duty of the officers intrusted with the transfer and renewal of bonds, to ascertain, in -every instance, aftey
April 14th 1862, whether the bond transferred represented a con
fiscated bond, 'and to Certify whether it did or did not in the fornu
of the renewed bond. When, therefore, these officers failed, in
any case, through negligence, to certify on the face of a bond
issued by them that it represented a confiscated bond, when such
was the fact, it was the common case of an agent acting negligently in the regular course of his employment. The law is well
settled and familiar that, in such cases, the principal must bear
the consequences of his agent's negligence, as between' himself
and an innocent third person, 'even though -the act or omission of
the agent, which constitutes the negligence, was wholly unauthorized by the principal, or even positively.forbidden by him: 1
Parsons' Sel. Ca. 180; 14 How. Rep. 486. Upon this principle
a bank is held to suffer for the negligence of its officer, who
received from an innocent person payment of a debt in forged
notes, which purport to be the issue of the bank: U. S. Bank v.
Bank of Georgia, 10 Wheat. Rep. 388.
So when an officer of a
bank, through negligence, pays to an innocent holder a forged
check which purports to be drawn upon the bank by one of its
customers: Levy v. Bank of U. S., 1 Binn. Rep. 27. And so
the bank must bear the loss, where its officer permits a transfer of
stock under a forged power of attorney, or is otherwise guilty of
negligence or of fraud in the issue or transfer of stock: Davis v.
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Bank qf England, 2 Bingham 393; Pollock v. National Bank,
3 Sold. Rep. 274; Bank of .Kentucky v. Schuylkill Bank, 1 Parsons' Sl.Ca. 180 ; BridgportBank v. . . and N. H. Railroad
Co., 30 Conn. Rep*- 231; .N. Y. and .N.H. Railroad Co., 34 N.
Y. Rep. 30; Sewall v. Boston Water Power Co., 4 Allen Rep.
277.
The city bonds, as I have said, were put upon the market by
the city and were the subject of daily traffic. The public were
incited to deal in them, and it was important to the credit of the
city that they should do so with confidence and safety. To insure
its own safety, and at the same time the safety of purchasers, the
city undertook to mark the class of confiscated bonds. Upon
principles of good faith and fair dealing, we must consider that
the intention was, not only to admonish purchasers as to what
bonds they could not buy withou' risk, but also to inform them as
to what bonds they might buy with safety. The absen.ce of a
statement in a bond that it represented a confiscated bond, was
equivalent to a representation to the person to whom it was issued
and to all others who might trade for it, that it did not represent
such a bond. It was -in law the representation of the city,
because made in its behalf by officers charged by it. with the duty
of issuing all bonds and of representing', on the face of each,
*hether it did or did not -belong to the clash of confiscated
bonds.
From the nature of the business, the city knew that this representation, conveyed by the form of the bond, would be reliat on,
and -must have intended that it should be. When a party has
relied upon.it, and in good faith' paid his money on the faith'of
it, it would be the height-of injustice to allow the city to say to
him that it is not true, and that it was his folly to believe it.
This case therefore falls within the principle of estoppel in pais,
and the city must be held liable to De Voss to the same extent
as if -the representation conveyed by the form of the bond was in
fact 'true. It is. not necessary, in order to bring a case within
the principle of estoppel, that the represeitation should be made
f audulently, or with a pQsitive intention to deceive ; nor, on. the
other hand, is it enough that it has been relied on, in'point of
fact, when there was no intention that it should be, or reasonable
expectation, from the course of business or otherwise, that it
would be.
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The principle, as stated by Lord DENMAN in Pickardv. S ears,
6 Ad. & El. Rep. 469 (33 E. C. L. R. 115), is, that "when one
by his acts or conduct wilfully causes another to believe the
e7ristence of a certain state of things, and induces him to act on
that belief, so as to alter his own previous position, the former is
concluded from averring against the latter, a different state of
things existing at the same time." In Preeman v. Cooke, 2
Exch. Rep. 663, Baron PARKE, delivering the judgment of the
court, said, that by the term "wilfully," as here used by Lord
.DENMAN2, " we must understand, if nat that the party represents
that to be true which he knows to be untrue, at least that he
pneans his representation to be acted upon, and that it is acted
Lpon accordingly; and if, whatever a. man's real intention may
be, he so conducts himself that a reasonable man could take the
iepresentation to be true, and believe that it was meant ihat he
snould act upon it, and did act upon it, as true, the party making
the representation would be equally precluded from contesting its
,ruth; and conduct by negligence or omission, when there is a
.tuty cast upon a person, by usage of trade or otherwise, to disclose the truth, may often have the same effect." Here the duty
of making known the truth as to the character of every bond
issued after April 14th 1862, was cast upon the city by its own
undertaking.
In a case in.which a corporation put its bonds upon the market,
under certain implied. representations inviting public confidence
in thir validity and value, but where no direct and express representation had been made to the particular purchaser, the Supreme
Court said: "A corporation, quite as much as an individual,.is
held to a careful adherence to truth in their dealings with mankind, and cannot, by their representations or silence, involve
others in onerous engagements, and then defeat the calculations
and claims their own conduct has superinduced:" Zabriskie v.
C. C. - C. B. B. Co., 23 Howard Rep. 381. The same language
was repeated subsequently in the case of a municipal corporation:
Bissell v. City of Jeffersonville, 24 Howard Rep. 287.
It was said in the argument by the counsel for the appelle;,
that the city itself had no authority, under the charter, to execute the bond to De Voss, because it was not given for money
lent to the city, or for any other sufficient consideration. But
the city had authority to execute bonds in proper cases without
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limit as to number or amount, and, for reasons already mentioned,

it cannot allege against De Voss that this particular bond was
not executed in a proper case. And it' is at least doubtful upon
the authqrities, whether a corporation can, in any case, allege
against a third person who has contracted with it, that its contract
was void because ultra vires, when the other party had no knowledge of the facts which made it so: BasterA Gounties B. Go. v.
Hawkes, 85 Eng. L. & Eq. Rep. 8; Bateman v. Ma/or, &c., 8
H. & Nor. Rep. 823 ; Bissell v. Mich. S. &N. Id. B. B' Go.,
22 N. Y. Rep. 258. If this had been the case of shares of stock
issued in excess of the number directed by the charter, the case
would have been different; fo:, in such' acase, as was said in the
case of N. . &-N. Hf. B. B. Go. v. Schuyler et al., 34 N. Y.
Rep. 30, the validity of such shares is a legal impossibility.
There is a class of cases in New York, relied on for the appel.
lants, in whieh it has been settled, as the law of that state, appli.
cable to all cases of agency, that where, upon comparing the act
of the agent with the power given to him, it appears to be such
an act as the agent may lawfully do under the power, and- the
question whether it was ,infact done in conformity with the
power, or was an abuse of it, depends upon the state of extrinsic
facts within the knowledge of the agent, and not -known to the
other party, such other paity has a right to -presume that the
state of extrinsic facts is such as to authorize-the act, and. the
principal will be bound. The' doing by the agent of an acf of
such a kind that it may be within the power, is regarded' as a
representation by him that in point of fact it is within it; a repre.
sentation which, it is held, he has authority from the principal to
make, resulting -by implication from his employment, and all
persons dealing in good faith ari held. entitled to rely on the
truth 'of this. representation: .o'rNt River Bank-v., Aymar, 3
Hill Rep. 262; P. &- H. Bank v.B. & D. Bank, 16 N. Y.
Rep, 125'; E ch. Bank v. Monteath, 26 N. Y. Rep: 505; Griswoold v. Haren, 25 N. Y. Rep. 596 ; N. .Y .N. i. B. B. Co.
v. Schuyler et al., 34 N. Y. Rep. 80. This 'doctrine wa§ not
established without strong opposition, and was objected to As
unsound in principle and in conflict 'with authority: AleA. Bank
v. N. Y.4&N. Hf. B. B. Go., .3 Kernan Rep. 599;' op. of
CoMsTocK, J., i6 N. Y. Rep. 125, and. cases cited. See also
Stagg v. E-lliott, 12 0. B. Rep. N. S. 87 (104 E: C L. Rep.);
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Hussey v. Beecher, 3 Cush. Rep. '511; Sears v. Wingate, 3
Allen Rep. 103; HMann v. King, 6 Munf. Rep. 428; Stainbach
v. Bead & Co., 11 Gratt. Rep. 281; Same v. Bank of 17a.,
Ibid. 269.
If this doctrine is sound, it has a conclusive application to the
present case. But I have not found it necessary to invoke so
broad a principle, and as there seems to be difficulty in reconciling
the authorities, I hate thought it best to decide this case upon its
own special circumstances, .and to leave the general question
-open until a case shall arise which renders its decision necessary.
I am of opinion that- the decree should be reversed and the
bill dismissed.

Superior Court of Oticago.
CONNECTICUT MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE CO. v. WINCHESTER
HALL ET AL
During a war contracts between citizens of the opposing belligerents are completely suspended, and cannot be enforced even by a proceeding in rem.
Therefore a mortgagee of land in Illinois could not sue out his mortgage while
the mortgagor was a citizen of Louisiana, which was in insurrection; and a decree
of foreclosure m4de under such circumstances was opened by a court of equity,
although the statutory period for redemption had passed.
JAMESON, J.-This is a petition for leave to come in, pursuant
to the provisions of chapter 21, section 15, of the Revised Stat.
utes, and file an answer to a bill of foreclosure, on which a final
decree was entered in 1862.
The facts upon which the petition, as originally filed, was
grounded were that the Connecticut Mutual Life Insuranie Company, in March 1862, filed a bill to foreclose a mortgage given
by the petitioner and his wife in 1859, upon certain lands in
Chicago, to secure a bond for $8000, payable in 1864, with interest semi-annually. The bill alleged a failure to pay several
instalments of interest due according to the conditions of the
bond. This suit was prosecuted to a decree of foreclosure, undel
which a sale of the mortgaged premises was made September 15th
1862. From this sale no redemption was effected. The petitioner
stated that of all the defendants in the suit he was the only one
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nterested therein, the other defendants being merely nominal
parties; that he was never served with process in the suit or
notified of its pendency until within a few months before the filing
of the petition, and that the only ground of jurisdiction in the
court to render the decree against him was the publication of a
notice in a newspaper in the city of Chicago. As the statute,
under which the petitioner sought to come in and defend, fixed
three years as the period within which this might be done, and as
much more than the three years had elapsed at the time the petition was filed, he sought to avoid the effect of the statute by setting up facts tending, as he claimed, to excuse him for his delay.
He alleged that before, and at the time of filing, the bill of foreclosure, and during its progress to a final decree, the petitioner
and his wife were, and that they still continued to be, inhabitants
of the state of Louisiana; that during the entire period from
July 13th 1861 to June 13th 1865, a state of hostilities which
constitute'd a public war, or such a war as carried with it all the
consequences of a public war, existed between the United States,
including Connecticut and fllinois, on the one hand, and the
organization of states known as the Confederate- States, of which
Louisiana was one, on the other; that by the laws of war and by
the law. of nations, as well as by the Act of Congress of the 13th
of July 1861, and the proclamation of the President of the 16th
of August 1861, issued in .pursuance thereof, all commercial
intercourse between the inhabitants of the rebel states and those
of the loyal states was, during all the period indicated, unlawful,
and that all remedies for the recovery of debts were therefore
suspended..
To this petition ,the. counsel for the insurance company interposed two objections, one going to the form and the other to the
aubst .nce of the petition. The first was, that the potition was
defective in that it did not affirmatively show tliat the petitioner
was not an inhabitant of some part of the state of Louisiana
excepted out of -the operation of the President's proclamation of
August 16th 1861, prohibiting intercourie as -aforesaid. ,That
proclamation declared'a state of hostilities to exist, and ordered
a suspension of commercial intercourse between the inhabitants
of the loyal states and those of the rebel states, except such parts
of tb,' latter as -maintained a loyal adhesion to the Union, or as
were 4r:m time to time occupied and conirolled by the forces of
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the United States. The petitioner, it was said, might have been
an inhabitant of some part of the state of Louisiana thus excepted, and so intercourse not in that case being unlawful between
him and the citizens of Connecticut and Illinois, he might have
interposed his defence within the three years.
This objection was sustained by the court, but leave was given,
if the facts would warrant it, to amend the petition so as to obviate
the objection.
The second objection was, that in any view of the facts relating
to petitioner's residence at the Southf the bar of the statute was
complete; that the late- civil war did not suspend the operation
of the statute between the inhabitants of the belligerent sections.
This objection was overruled, the court being of the opinion,
upon a full consideration of the authorities, that if the facts were
as claimed, the operation of the statute was suspended, and that it
created no bar against the petitioner in this case.
An amended petition was thereupon filed, which was supposed
to conform to the views of the court, and which averred in
general terms that the defendant was, during the period mentioned, an inhabitant of the rebel state of Louisiana, and not of
any part of that or any other state excepted by the President
from the operation of his said proclamation. As certain parts of
the state of Louisiana were, however, amongst the excepted districts, objection was made to this amended petition, that it .ought
to siate precisely and in. the affirmative the facts as to the resi-"
dence or inhabitancy of the defendant, so that the coinplainant
might traverse them and still throw uponi the defendant, who
could best furnish the proofs, the burden of establishing the issue.
-This objection was sustained, but leave was .again given to amend
so as to obviate it. I am now to determine the sufficiency of the
prtition as thus finally amended to entitle the defendant to come
in and answer the bill.
Beside the allegations previously made, the petition contains
others to the effect that from the commencement of the war up to
March 1st 1862, the petitioner was an inhabitant, of the parish of
Lafourche, Louisiana, that on that day he entered the Confederate
service as an officer, and continued to be an officer until the end
of the war; that during all this time he was within the Confederate lines, a belligerent, in the actual service of the Confederate
government; that on the 3d of July 1863, he was wounded and
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taken a prisoner of'war at Vicksburg, and held as such until tho
12th of June 1864, when he was exchanged ; that while a prisoner
qf war he was paroled, and by the terms of his parol, was confined to the neighborhood of Thibodeaux in said parish of Lafourche, until the 1st of February 1864, when he was sent to
Pascagoula, then within the Confederate lines; that the Federal
forces, though not in the actual possession of Thibodeaux when
the petitioner arrived there as a prisoner of war, entered that
place a few days afterwards, and remained there until he was sent
to. Paseagoula, as aforesaid. It is also alleged, generally, that
from the time of his entering the army on the 1st of March 1862,
until the close of the war, the petitioner had no domicil in said
parish of Lafourche, and that his family did not reside in said
parish from the 1st day of December 1862 until the close of the
war.
The material, facts, then, are, that from the breaking out of
hostilities up to July 3d.1863, when he became a prisoner of war,
the petitioner was an inhabitant of a part of the state of Louisiana
not excepted* from the .operation of the President's proclamation
of August 16th 1861; and that from the 3d of 'July 1863 up to
February 1864, he was present as a prisoner.of war in the parish
of Lafourche, in said -state, which'was then occupied by the
Federal foices and was within the Federal lines, after which he
was within the rebel lines so long as the war lasted. Precisely
when he was in that state, during the period first named, it is true,
is not stated, and, so.far, the petition is still defective, after so
many amendments, but I shall treat it as though what-is stated in
it negatively were affirmed positively, as I am assured that it is
only from inadvrtence or from not knowing the importance -of
accounting tor petitioner's inhabitancy during that period, that.
the allegation failed thus to be made according to the fact.
It is apparont, that in the view of petitioner's coutisel, the fact
that- he bore a military character during the second period indicated, although in the rebel service, makes some difference with
%
his rights in this court.
I shall first assume that he has the same rights as h'e would
have, had he been simply a civilian 'instead of being a colonel in
the rebel army.. Under such circumstances, is he entitled to come
iu and answer, or has he been barred by the statute refeirred to ?
It is clear that he has not been barred, if, first, he was proVOL. XVI.-39
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hibited by the proclamations of the President from all pacific
intercourse with the complainant in this case, during the three
years following the decree ; or if, secondly, by the laws of the
United States, had he come to the state of Illinois during the
said three years, he could not have effectually appeared to assert
his equitable rights in her courts, on account of his previous rebel
character.
1. Now there are four proclamations of the President that may
be supposed to have a bearing upon the first of these propositions.
The earliest of these was the pr6clamation of August 16th
1861, issued in pursuince of the Act of Congress of July 18'th
1861, interdicting commercial intercourse between the inhabitants of the sections at war with each other, but excepting from
the interdict the inhabitants of West Virginia and of such parts
of the other Southern States as should from time to time be occupied and controlled by the forces of the United States engaged
in the dispersion of the insurgents. In connection with this
should be considered the second proclamation modifying it-that
of Apfil 2d 1868-the tenor of which was to repeal the exceptions just noticed, on account of the embarrassments created by
them in the operations of the goverinment. Now, what was the
effect of these proclamations upon the petitioner ? Clearly, it
was to make it illegal and, therefore, in law impossible for hiin to
hold. a.ny pacific intercourse with the complainants from August
16th 1861, up to the time when he became a prisoner-of war at
Vicksburg, on the 8d of July 1863 ; because, being a rebel during
that period, he was not an inhabitant of a 8tate or part of a state
3ccupied or controlled by the Federal forces, or otherwise within
the exceptions in the first proclamation. Again: before the date,
of his capture by the Federal forces, namely, on the 2d of April
1868, all exceptions made to the operation of that proclamation
were repealed, whereby commercial intercourse became absolutely
unlawful between the petitioner, being an inhabitant of a rebel
state, and the inhabitants of a loyal state, whether he was in a
part of a rebel state occupied and controlled by the Federal forces,
&c., &c., or not. It follows, that, if the facts are as supposed,
these prociamations did'not make it legal or possible, but made
it illegal and impossible, for the petitioner to appear and defend
this case in our courts, at any time during the war. The two
remaining proclamations are those known as the Amnesty Pro-
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clamations, that of December 8th 1863, and that of March 26th
1864, explaining and qualifying it, containing the scheme of
reconstruction devised by President Lincoln. These proclamations promised amnesty and restoration of all rights of property,
except as to slavery, or in cases where the interests of third persons would be affected, to all rebels, with certain exceptions, upon
their taking the.oath prescribed. The excepted classes were,
with others, military officers above the rank of colonel, and persons
on parole as prisoners of war at the time they should seek to take
the oath. Provision was made, however, that persons excluded
by these conditions might make special application to the President for clemency, like other criminals. From the 1st day of
February, then, when the petitioner ceased to be a prisoner in
Federal hands, up to the end of war, it was, apparently, in his power
to secure amnesty and restoration of his rights of property, and
with them his'competence to sue and defend in our courts, by simply
quitting the rebel service and taking the amnesty oath ; for it is
admitted, that his rank in that. service at no time was above that
of colonel, and even if this were denied, it would still be true,
that during, the last year and a half of the war, it was in his
power to apply for pardon and amnesty; and if was perhaps so
far his duty to do so, that if he failed to make the application hd
could not claim to have been- prevented from appearing to defend
this cause, so as to avoid the bar of the statute.
2. Admitting, then, that under these proclamations, or some
of them, it was lawful, or could have been made lawful, for the
petitioner to hold pacific intercourse 'with the complainant, .his
creditor, was there any law which would have prevented him
from asserting his -right.to redeem in the courts of Illinois, had
he come hither?
I find but one law of Congress that might seem to render nugatory any attempt on his part to enforce here his equity of redemp.
tion. It is an act approved July 17th 1862, entitled, "An act
to suppress insurrection, to punish treason and rebellion, to seize
and confiscate the prpperty of rebels, and for other purposes."
The fifth section of this act is as follows
SEc. 5. And be it further enacted, That, to insure the speedy termination of the
present rebellion, it.shall be the duty of the President of the United States to
cause the seizure of all the estate and property, money, stocks, credits and effects
of the persons hereinafter named in this section, and.to apply and use'the same
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and the proceeds thereof for the support of the army of the United States, that is
to say :First. Of any person hereafter acting as an officer of the army or navy of the
rebels in arms against the government of the United States.
Sixthly. Of any person who, owning property in any loyal state or territory of
the United States, or in the District of Columbia, shall hereafter assist and give
aid and comfort to such rebellion ; and all sales, transfers, or conveyances of any
such property shall be null and void; and it shall be a sufficient bar to any suit
brought by such person foi the possession or the use of such property, or any of it,
to allege and prove that he is one of the persons described in this section.

It has been held, that this act is binding upon the state, no less
than upon the Federal courts: Norris v. Doniphan, 3 Am: Law
Register (New Series) p. 471, per BULLITT, J., decided in the
Kentucky Oourt of Appeals.
But does the act -have the effect to prevent a defendant from
interposing his defence in a case like the one at bar ? *It doubt-.
less relates to classes of persons among which the petitioner must
be reckoned ; persons thereafter acting as officers of the army of
the rebels, or who, owning property in a loyal state, should thereafter assist and give aid and comfort to, the rebellion. But coming
to the important clause, which provides for setting up such a
character or conduct as a bar to suits, it is clear that it does nof
affect the petitioner. It bears only upon cases in which suitp
should have been brought by rebel officers, or by persons aiding
the i'bellion, for the possession or use of property belonging to
them in loyal states. For our purpose it is sufficient to- say, that
this suit was not brought by the petitioner, and that, for that
reason alone, the statute cannot apply. And if it were contended
that, upon the equity of the statute, a; complainant ought to be
enabled by it to reply to a defence set up by a rebel officer, the
answer is, that, by suing such a person, the complainant ought to
be held estopped from afterwards setting up that he had no standing in court to defend.
The next question is, does the fact that the petitioner was a
rebel colonel, while a prisoner of war within our lines, make any
?
difference as to his rights
It is contended by his counsel that if the effect of the laws and
proclamations cited was to make it his duty to appear and defend
within the three years, his military character and relations excused and prevented him from doing so. The only principles
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upon which this could be claimed are, first, that his enlistment
and military oath subjected him to a vis major, which controlled
his actions at and before the time when the decree was entered,
and continued to do so down to the end of the war, even while a
prisoner, and that, consequently, it was impossible for him to
appear in the cause ; or, secondly, that, while in the rebel service, he .was bound by his military honor not to desert therefrom
and come North, although while a prisoner of war in Federal
hands it might have been physically possible for him to do so.
I As to the first principle, I think there is no force in it whatever.
Admitting that a vis major compelled his continued service whilst
he was within the rebel lines, it ceased so soon as he came into
our hands as a prisoner of war. His allegiance had always been
due to the government of the United States. So long as he .was
constrained by overpowering force he could not pay that allegiance to his true- sovereign, but when that force was removed he
could and ought to do so. Certainly, in the courts of his sovereign, it would be impossible to recognise the constraint of the
vis major any longer than it in fact existed.
In this respect, perhaps, the rule would be different in a foreign
war. A prisoner in oui hands in such a war would owe allegiance to the foreign sovereign as much when a captive as before,
and doubtless while he remained a prisoner would be as incapable
of suing or defending upon a contract entered inio before the-war
as though still in the hostile ranks. Duty would not, as in the
case of a rebel in a civil war, require him to renounce his connection with the hostile forces, and. to aid those of the government
opposed to them, whose prisoner he was.
The second prificiple rests on the supposed controlling effect of
the point'of honor. Having once entered the 'anks of rebellion,
whether under constraint or otherwise, military honor required,
it is supposed, that the soldier should continue there for ever.
As a question of. etiquette this may be conceded to be true. But
it is not known thit that honor, which is' said -to obtain among
certain classes of petty criminals, has ever been recognised by. t~le
courts as furnishing a rule of decision, even between them*selves,
much less between them and those upon whom their depredations
have been committed. The same- observation must hold true in
regard to the more gentlemanly but mote heinous criminals, by
whom the peace of our country has fog years been disturbed. In
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saying this, I do not take it upon myself to punish persons
engaged in the rebellion-I am simply affirming that the fact of
their having been rebels furnishes no ground for enlarging their
rights in our courts. The conclusion, then, is, if, by deserting
the rebel ranks and betaking himself to the state of Illinois, the
petitioner could have effectually appeared and defended this suit,
it was his duty to do so, however ungentlemanly from the rebel
point of view such conduct might have been.
There is one consideration, however, adverted to but not'pressed
bj counsel on the argument, which in my judgment is decisive of
the case in petitioner's favor, whatever may be thought of those
already presented.
At the time the bill in this case was filed, a state of war existed
between the inhabitants of the rebel states, including the petitioner, and the inhabitants of the loyal states, including the complainant. That this war was a civil war, makes no difference in its
bearings upon this cause. It is enough that it was recognised by
the Federal authorities, including the highest court in the land,
as a'war, of which they claimed for the United States and accorded
to the rebels, the rights as determined by writers on public law.
It has long been a settled maxim, that the existence of the hostile
relation suspends all pacific intercourse between the respective
belligerents: .rriswold v. JFaddington, 16 Johns. R. 488. All
contracts entered into, during the existence of a war, are, with a
few exceptions relating'to the ransom or maintenance of.prisoners
of war, absolutely void. The reason of this is, first, that by
buying from, or.selling to, an enemy, I may directly or indirectly
enhance his ability to continue the war; and secondly, and
chiefly, that the intercourse necessary to the consummation of con-.
tracts with an enemy would furnish Tacilities for traitorous correspondence with little chance of detection: The iJulia, 8 Cranch
192. This danger is so great, that all intercourse whatever, except that of mutual. destruction under the guidance of the public
authorities, is interdicted. As a consequence, contracts entered
into before the war are absolutely suspended whilst the war continues, not so much because the enemy might have his means of
supporting the war increased by allowing them to be enforced,
for the benefit might accrue equally to both belligerents, as
because the intercourse necessary to enforce them or to fulfil
them is inconsistent with the state of war, which is one of mutual
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hostility between every man of the one, and every man of the
other, belligerent. And though it be certain, in any particular
case, that no harm can result from the intercourse, the rule is the
same. Thus, a citizen of one country cannot draw bills upon a
citizen of another country at war with his own, for the purpose
of appropriating funds deposited with him to the use of another
enemy, not even for the purpose of withdrawing the funds for hi.3
own use: Hoare v. Allen, 2 Dallas 102; Griswold v Waddington, 16 Johns. 438, 481-84; Willison v. -Patterson,7 Taunton
438; Conn v. -Penn,1 Peters 496. On the same principle, it is
unlawful for the owner of property in a foreign country at the
time ivar breaks out between it and that of the owner, to withdraw- it, unless it be done immediately after war is declared.
Otherwise, if taken by the cruisers of the owner's country, it
would be liable to condemnation as prize: The Rapid, 1 Gallison
295; 'same case on appeal, 8 Cranch 155 ; The William Bagalay,
5 Wallace 377. And in one case, where certain British merchants
had debts owing to them from French merchants, residing in
Guadaloupe, which had been contracted prior to the war, and
certain sugars had been received by the agent of the creditors
from the debtors, as payment of those debts, and shipped to his
principals, it was held, that such a remittance was unlawful, and
the ground of the decision was, that the allowing of a commerce
with the enemy, under such circumstances, without a license,
would be opening the door to treasonable communications: the
case'of The William, cited by KENT, Ch., in Griswold v. Wad-.
dington, 16 Johns. 460. From this it doubtless follQws that the
slight intercourse necessary to enable a creditor to receive payment of his debt .from his debtor enemy would be unlawful. As
Chancellor KENT observed in the case just cited, "the idea that
any remission of money may be lawfully made, to an enemy is
repugnant to the very rights of war." And to make it certain
that he regarded it equally uhlawful to receive money from an
enemy as to pay-it, he added: "repugnant to the very rights of
war, which require the subjects of one country to seize the effects
of the s8ubjects of the other :" Id. 482. In a state of war, although
every man of each nation is an enemy, still it is the. war of the
nations and not of the individuals, and hence when individuals
seize the property of their enemies, as their duty requires, they
seize it for national, and not for individual use ; they seize it, not
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to appropriate it to the payment of debts due them fromi the
owners, but to preserve it for confiscation, that is, for condemnation to the fisc, or public treasury.
These positions are clearly deducible from the authorities. If
the question were, then, whether, pending the late war, it would
have been lawful for a creditor residing here to receive payment
)f his debt, in money or in goods, from his debtor enemy residing
in the Confederacy., the answer would very clearly be, that it
would not have been lawful. But admitting this, does it follow,
that, during a war, contracts made before the war are so far sus.
pended as to forbid a pyoceeding to enforce them in rem, when
the. res lies at the creditor's hand ? I find no direct authority
upon the question, but I am satisfied the suspension is complete
for all purposes, while the hostile relation subsists.
In the first place, proceedings in rem never are, or can be
allowed to ripen into a judgment without some sort'of rrotice,
either published in the journals or sent to the owner alleged to
be indebted, by the person claiming to'be his*creditor. When a
3tate of war exists, is it not a violation of the creditor's allegiance
to attempt to communicate with an enemy, for a private purpose,
in either of the modes indicated ? What right has he to despatch
to his debtor a missive relating to his private business, or to
address to him a communication through: the. public prints ?
Intercourse of that kind would be liable to all the abuses apprehended from those commercial transactions which are interdicted'
by law. It is, in my judgment, therefore, within both the reason
and the letter of the prohibition against intercourse with a public
enemy. If it be said, that when a notice is published in a newspaper, it is unnecessary, and that it is not intended that it should
come to the debtor's knowledge ; that the principal object of it is'
to give the court jurisdiction, and that this is given, equally, when
the notice has been seen by the debtor in fact'and when it has
not; the answer is, that the court must presume either that the
debtor has seen it or that he has not. If it presumes that he has
seen it, knowing his relation, it is bound to note the impropriety
&fthe intercourse by which it was brought to his knowledge, and
to refuse to sanction it. If it presumes that he has not seen it,
because his relations to the plaintiff are such that it could not
reach him, then it should decline to assert a jurisdiction which
could only operate as a fraud. For it is not true, that the only
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object of a published notice is to give jurisdiction; it is also
designed to apprise the debtor that legal proceedings have been
commenced, to enable him to appear and make defence, if he
choose. Without the latter condition, indeed, the proceedings
would be, jure gentium, invalid. When, in the suit to foreclose
the mortgage in this case, then, the notice was published in a
newspaper, directed to the petitioner, informing him that, as ho
had failed to pay his bond, a bill had been filed to foreclose the
mortgage, was it expected by the complainant that the petitioner
would receive the notice, or was it believed that he could not
receive it, or act upon it if he did receive it ? In either event,
equally, the publication of the notice was illegal, and might have
been. punished as an act of unlawful intercourse with a public
enemy. Upon such an act no court could found a rightful jurisdiction to proceed to render judgment. If it was believed that
the petitioner would or might receive the notice, but that he
would be unable to appear to defend the suit, or to protect his
interests at the sale, because he sustained the relation of an
enemy ; or, if it was expected, that he would not, because it was
known that he could not receive it, the taking of the decree was
a fraud upon him and upon the court. The only-principle upon
which it could be justified would be, that the debtor being an.
enemy, had no rights which a court of 'justice was bound to rspect. If the mere publication of a notice in a newspaper could
be made the ground of jurisdiction *against an enemy's property,
under the circumstances supposed, why might it not also against
the estate of an infant in utero, or against the property of a dead
man ? Titles thus acquired would rest upon a basis of robbery,
not upon a judicial divestiture of the debtor's interest, recognised
as just jure gentium. Nor could such transfers be sustained as
acts of confiscation, since whenever that most odious right of war
is exercised, it is done for the benefit, not of individuals, but of
the public.
For these reasons I am of the opinion that, if it be true, as
alleged in the petition, that in 1862, wlien the bill in this case
was filed, the petitioner was an inhabitant of a country stap.ding
in a' hostile relation to that of which the complainant was an
inhabitant, the contract of mortgage was suspended, and that the
proceeding to foreclose it was unauthorized ab initio. From this
it follows, that had the petitioner sued out a writ of error in
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proper time, the decree must have been reversed and the bill
dismissed. An order will, therefore, be entered permitting the
petitioner further to amend his petition according to the facts as
indicated above, within one week, and ten days thereafter to file
an answer to the bill, upon payment of all the costs ; unless the
complainant, in the meantime, shall have taken issue upoD +'
material facts stated in the petition.

.
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THE MATTER OF
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ISAAC ROSENFIELD,

Terey.

A BANKRUPT.

The creation of a debt by fraud is not a ground for refusing a discharge to P,
bankrupt.
A specification stating that debt had been created by fraud is not a good specif,
cation, and will be stricken out on motion.
A bankrupt cannot be examined for the purpose of showing that the debt w&j
created by fraud.
A fraudulent conveyance made, or a fraudulent preference given, before the pasLage of the Bankrupt Act, are neither of them good grounds upon which to obpos3
a discharge. Such a conveyance or preference does not come within the terms of
section 29 of said act, and a specification alleging such a conveyance or preference
will be stricken out on motion.
The difference. explained between the meaning of the following phrases in section 2.9, viz.: "Since the passage of this act," and "subsequently to the passage
of this act."
By the term "fraudulent preference," used in item nine of section 29, is meant
only a preference in fraud of the Bankrupt Act, that Is, contrary to its provisions.

APPLICATION for discharge of bankrupt.
Abbett & Fuller, for the bankrupt.
AleCarter & aoepp, for creditors.
FIELD, J.-There

are two questions, the determination of

which will dispose of all the exceptions taken to the specifications filed in this case.
1. Is the creation of a debt by fraud, a good ground upon
which to oppose the discharge of a bankrupt ?
The 38d section of the act provides: "That no debt created
by the fraud of the bankrupt, shall be discharged under this act ;
but the debt may be proved, and the dividend thereon shall be a
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payment on account of said debt." Why, then, should a creditor
be allowed to object to the discharge of a bankrupt, on the ground
that the debt due to him was created by fraud ? So far as he is
concerned, the bankrupt is not discharged at all. He is in fact
a favored creditor; like other creditors, he is entitled to receive a
dividend; but this dividend, instead of being a payment in full,
is only a payment on account, and the bankrupt is for ever liable
for the balance of the debt; and this balance is much more likely
to be paid, if the bankrupt is discharged from the payment of all
his other debts, than if he was not discharged at all. Such a
cieditor, therefore, has not only no right to oppose the discharge,
but it is not his interest to do so. This, no doubt, is the reason
why The fact that the debt was created by fraud, is not, by the
29th section, made a ground for refusing a discharge.
If the question, therefore, had not before arisen, I should have
had little or'no .doubt with regard to it. But it is not a new question. -It has been before Judge BLATCHFORD, in the Southern
District of New Yorki upon two occasions; once in Ralhbone's
Case, Weekly Bankrupt Register, March 2d 1868, p. 65; and
again in the case of -DariusTalman, Weekly Bankrupt Register,
4pril 20th 1868, p. 122. In the first case, he held, that a specification, stating that the debt had been created by fraud, was not
a good specification; and in-the second, that a register was right
in refusing to allow a bankrupt to be examined for the purpose of
showing that the debt was created by fraud. I concur with him
entirely in opinion.
2. The second question is one about which there is, I will not
say more doubt, but perhaps more room for discussion ; and as
the counsel for the creditors have urged tleir views with so much
force and earnestness, I have felt bound to give them a very careful consideration. Is a fyaudulent conveyance, made before the
passage of the Bankrupt Act, a good ground upon which to oppose
a discharge?
The 29th section contains an enumeration of seventeen distinct
acts, any one of which, if shown to have been committed by the
bankrupt, is an absolute -bar to his discharge. These aQts are In
the nature of offences, created and -defined by the bankrupt law,
the penalty for the commission of which by the bankrupt, is the
forfeiture of his right to a discharge. Now, suppose there was
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no limitation whatever in the law itself, as to the time within
which these acts must have taken place or been performed; would
it not have been necessary to aver and prove, that they had been
committed since the passage of the law, in order to deprive the
bankrupt of his right to a discharge ? To have held that acts
cbmmitted before its passage were offences against the bankrupt
law, would have been to make that law, if riot an ex post facto
law, in the strict sense of the term, yet at least a law, retroactive
or retrospective in its character. Now, although to give a law a
retrospective operation, may not render it absolutely unconstitutional, yet as a general rule, it is a very objectionable feature in
any law; and an intention upon the part of the legislature to give
a law such a character, will never be presumed, in the absence of
express words to that effect.
But it is said, there is a limitation as to time expressly annexed
to some' of the acts enumerated in the 29th section, that limita
tion being expressed by the words, " since the passage of this
act," and as this limitation is not annexed to other acts, therefore, upon the' principle " ezxpressio u ius est exclusio alterius,"
it is to be presumed that with regard to these other acts, it is
sufficient to show that they were committed at any time, whether
before or since the passage of the law. If all the provisions of
the section are, upon general principles; subject to the restriction
that the acts. must have been done after the passage of the
law, 'why in express terms impose that restriction on two only out
of the seventeen?
But from a closer examination of the whole section, I think it
will appear, that the maxim alluded to has no application in
reference to it. To the first four items, no limitation as to time
is annexed; but then they are acts which could only be committed
after proceedings in bankruptcy had been commenced. The fifth
item has a limitation, expressed by the words, "1within four months
before the commencement of such proceedings." But this limita.
tion of four months was meant -to be confined to the fifth item
alone. It became necessary, therefore, to annex to the following
items a different limitation. The sixth item, accordingly, begins
with these words, "1or if since the passage of this act." Now, if
it was intended that this limitation should apply to all the following items, from the sixth to the fourteenth, it certainly was not
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necessary to repeat it at the beginning of each clause. The
39th section, which contains an enumeration of what are deemed
acts of bankruptcy, has the same limitation as to time, expressed
by the words, "after the passage of this act," annexed to the
first act described ; and there can be no doubt that it is meant to
extend to all the other acts therein enumerated ; but it was not
thought necessary to repeat it at the beginning of each subsequent
clause.
But it is said the fourteenth item of the 29th section has a
limitation expressly annexed to it, substantially the same as that
annexed to the sixth item; and if the limitation -contained in the
sixth item extends to all the intervening, items without. being
repeited, why would it not also have extended to the fourteenth
item. The fact that the very same limitation as that contained in
the sixth item, is expressly annexed to the fourteenth, shows that
it was not intended to apply to the intervening items.
But it will be perceived that the language in which the limitation is expressed in the fourteenth item, is slightly different from
thlat used in the sixth. Instead of being," since the passage of
this act," it.is 118ubsequently -to the passage of this act." Now,
let us see if we cannot account for this difference'in phraseology,
and thus explain 'vhy it was deemed 'necessary to repeat the limitation in the f6urteenth item, slightly varied in form. The
change consists in substituting "8dusequently' for ".ince."
These words, although similar in meaning, are not identi6al.
"1Since," according toWorcester, means' " from the time of;" and
its meaning is illustrated by. a line from Milton
"He since the morning hoar set out from Heaven."

o

And Webster, in his dictionary, says, "The proper signification
of since is after, and its appropriate sense includes the whole
pe24od beiween an event and the present time. I have not seen
my brother since January." "Subsequently," according to the
same authorities" means "at a later time,", or, " afterwarjs," that
is, at any time afteri#ards.
Now, the act described in the fourteenth item is that bf a
merchant or tradesman, not keeping proper books of account.
If the limitation had been expressed by the words, "since the
passage of this act," it might have been said, that to bring a
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merchant or tradesman within its provisions, he must, during the
whole period from the passage of the act, have neglected to keep
proper books of account. Whereas, by using the word " subsequently" it would be sufficient to show that he had, at any time
after the passage of the act, neglected to keep proper books of
account. And this, no doubt, is what was intended by the pro.
vision. We see, therefore, why it was, thit in the fourteenth
item it was thought .necessary to repeat the limitation annexed to
the sixth item, but to express it in a somewhat different form.
The fact, then, of such repetition in the fourteenth item, does not
prove that the limitatiop annexed to the sixth item was not meant
to extend to all the intervening sections.
But let us see what would be the result of the construction
contended for by the counsel for the creditors.
The act described in the sixth item, to which the limitation as
to time is expressly annexed, is the act of destroying, mhutilating,
altering, or falsifying, books, documents, papers, writing, or
securities. This is certainly one of the grossest frauds that
could, possibly be committed by a bankrupt, and if this must be
committed since the passage of the act, in order to make it a
ground upon which to refuse a discharge, it would be difficult to
imagine upon what possible principle the same limitation was not
extended to the acts described in the following items. A construction involving such a result certainly cannot be the true
construction. At all events, it ought not to be adopted unless it
is imperatively required by the language of the act.
But again, by the construction contended for, if there is no
limitation as to time with regard to the tenth item, there is none
with regard to the ninth. The act described in the ninth item is,
a " fraudulent preference contrary to the provisions of this act.""
Now, could it have been intended, that the mere fact of a bankrupt having at any time before the passing of the act given a
preference to one or more of his creditors, would be a good ground
upon which to oppose his discharge. By the term "fraudulent
preference," of course, is meant only, a preference in fraud of
the Bankrupt Act: that is, contrary to its provisions. But in
New Jersey, at least, before the passage of the Bankrupt Act, a
debtor had a perfect right to prefer one creditor to another.
This has bnen repeatedly decided by the Supreme Court of the
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state: Irendricks v. Mount, 2 South. 738 ; Tillon v. Britton, 4
IHIalst. 120. Nay, it has been held, that it was the duty of the
debtor, under certain circumstances, to prefer one creditor to
another. It cannot be imagined for one moment, that the framers
of the law meant that an act committed before its passage, and
which was perfectly lawful at the time it was done, would be a
ground upon whioh.to refuse a bankrupt hl discharge.
Upon the whole, then, I am clearly of the opinion that either
the limitation as to time annexed to the sixth item was intended
to apply to all the intervening items between that and the fourt nth or that these intervening items, having no limitation as to
time annexed to them, mu~t be construed in reference to the principle-applicable to laws generally, which is, that they take effect
only from the time of the passage.
This is the view taken of the 39th section by those who have
written upon' the Bankrupt Act. James, after speaking of the
fifth item, says: "Next follows a series of misconduct or offences,
which, to affect the bankrupt's order of discharge, must have been
cbmmitted by him since the passage of the act:" James' Bankrupt. Law 129. See also Bankrupt Law by Avery. & Hobbs 214,
220.
This also would seem to be the view taken by. Judge.BLATCH.
FORD, in Rathbone's Case, before referred to. One of the specifi
cations was, fraud in an assignment made in 1854. It. was
objected to as being too vague. The objection was sustained, And
leave granted to file new specifications. The specifications were
then made more full and particular, and when the matter came up
again, the- .judge said: "The 2d and 3d specifications relate
solely to transactions by the bankrupt under and in regard to an
assignment made by him in 1854. They do .not set forth any
ground that is covered by section 29 of the act."
All the exceptions taken to the specifications filed in this case
are, therefore, sustained.

APPOLD'S ESTATE.

United States -DistrictCourt-Eastern District of Pennsyl.
vania.
ESTATE oF

BENJAMIN F. APPOLD,

Am INVOLUNTARY BANKRUPT.

So far as conformity in the procedure under executions out of the Federal courts,
and out of the courts of the respective states, had been attained under the Act of
Congress of 12th May 1828, and the rules of practice in the Federal courts, which,
under the authority conferred by that act, had, from time to time, been adopted
vefort the present bankrupt law was passed-the constitutional requirement that
the system of bankruptcy should be uniform throughout the United States has been
fulfilled if the bankrupt law operates uniformly upon whatever would have been
liable to execution if no such law had been passed, though the subjects of its operation may not be in all-respects the same in every one of the states.
Quwure, Whether under the present bankrupt law of the United States, goods of
the estate in the hands of the assignee are distrainable for rent ?
If they are not, it is because they are not less in legal custody than goods taken
in execution; and under the equity of any laws of the respective states which, like
the English statute 8 Ann. c. 14, entitle a landlord to payment of rent accrued,
not exceeding one year's, out of the proceeds of goods sold under an execution,
the landlord, who is prevented from distraining may demand such an amount of
rent from the assignee in bankruptcy.
Such-a rule of decision is not inconsistent with apparently contrary decisions
under the English system of bankruptcy.
Though rent, as such, may not accrue during the proceedings in bankruptcy, an
equal charge for storage may, for a certain period, under certain circumstances, be
incurred by the assignee.

THE room -in which the bankrupt bad conducted his business of
a grocer was leased to him at $62.50 per quarter. On January
24th 1868, the day appointed by the assignee for the sale of the
goods of the estate on the premises, a -bailiff of the landlord
appeared, and by virtue of a warrant from him, distrained the
goods for $125, due for two quarters' rent . The bailiff did not
sell the property, but it was agreed by and between the principal
and the assignee, that the latter should make the sale and that
the proceeds " in his hands should remain subject to the claim of
The assignee made
the landlord just as the goods then were."
the sale and received the proceeds. In his account, as audited
before the register, immediately following the staterient of the
balance for distribution, was a memorandum, that this balance was
subject to such rights as the landlord of the bankrupt might have
obtained by virtue of the levy made by his bailiff, and of the
agreement made as above by the assignee. The questions piesented were, 1st. Is the landlord entitled to take out of the
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balance in the hands of the assignee the sum of $125 due to him
by the bankrupt for rent ? and 2d. Has the register authority to
direct or sanction the payment of this sum to the landlord by the
assignee out of the balance in his hands as shown by the account.
These questions were certified by the register to the court.
OADWALADER, J.-Under the present system of bankruptcy in
the United States the estate in the hands of the assignee is more
determinately in legal custody than under the English system.
There is, therefore, I think, reason to doubt the applicability of
the English decisions that a landlord's right to distrain continues
after an assignment under the- bankruptcy of his tenant.' But
if these authorities are inapplicable, it does not follow that the
so.called lien of a landlord for rent should be-wholly disallowed.
The proceedings in, bankruptcy may then. have the effect of a
statutory execution so that the case of the bankrupt's landlord
may be within the equity of any laws of the respective states
which'entitle a landlord to payment out of the proceeds of goods
taken in execution. The Pennsylvania statute, following' the
English Act of 8 Ann. ch. 14, entitles him thus to receive an
I In a case of involuntary bankruptcy there certainly can be no distress while,
the estate is in custody of the marshaLas messenger; and the assignee succeeds to
this custody.
In the case of T e Estate of Samuel C. Brown, an in-oIuntary bankrupt (21st
October 1867), this court was of opinion that rent might be Paid by the assignees
on the same footing as under an execution, and that an equal amount as accruing
storage might be paid in addition so long as the assignees should necessarily occupy
the premises.
In a previous case of 7he Estate ofJeremiahM. Gale, also an involuntary bahkrupt, the landlord of the bankrupt commenced summary proceedings before an
alderman to recover .possession of the demised premises under the Pennsylvania
statute of 25th March 1825, Upon the petition of the assignee showing that his
dispossession would be injurious to the iiterests of the creditors, he was, on*the
19th August 1867, authorized by this court to, pay the rent, oi if not in futds, to
give security under the Pennsylvania statute. In this case it was desirable that'
the lease, fixtures, and good will should be sold with the late stock ir trade of the
bankrupt.
In a case of Schell, Berger 4- Co., voluntary ban]rupts, a provisional receiver
had been appointed after tl adjudication of bankruptcy and before the first mee4ing of.creditors. He was afterWards elected assignee.' But before he thus became
assignee, an order upon him as receiver to'pay rent was made, on*16th March
1868, upon the landlord's petition, showing that funds were in hand which ought
to be thus applied. The receiver certified that in his belief the landlord's claim
was correct.
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amount not exceeding a year's rent. Blackstone's opinion, 2
Com. 487, that the landlord was thus entitled to the benefit of
the analogy of the Statute of 8 Ann. where he omitted to dis
train, has been overruled in England only because the goods late
of the bankrupt on the demised premises are distrainable in Eng
land notwithstanding the assignment in bankruptcy. Otherwise
the case would be within the equity of the statute. This conclu
sion may be reachea without any necessity for considering the
rent as a lien properly so called.
Under the Maryland Insolvent Law it has been decided that
the property of an applicant for the benefit of that act is in the
custody of the la* and cannot be distrained, and also that; without a previous distress, the landlord has no recourse against the
estate. The latter part of this decision depends upon the local
statute law. The Statute 8 Ann., it is true, is in force in that
state ; but certain state laws are cited as controlling the decision'
there: 10 Md. 156.
Where the landlord makes a demand upon the assignee before
uhe removal of the goods for an amount not exceeding a year's
rent, it should, I think, if unpaid, be admitted as entitled to pliority of payment whether the right of distraining exists or not.
Where more than a year's rent is demanded, the question of the
existence of the right of distraining will arise. At'present I
intim.iate n& opinion upon this point. The claim is allowed under.
the alternative view of. the law which I have explained..'
In cases in which assignees- in good' faith keep the stock in
trade of a bankrupt in his former place 6f business for the purpose of either economical storage or advantageous disposal, if
there is no improper delay, the hire of the landlord's premises
may often be fairly valued by the standard of the former rent.
In such cases I have not hesitated ,to allow him an amount equal
to accruing rent. The cost of storage elsewhere would equitably
be considered a lien.
The first question of the register is, therefore, answered affirmatively. The landlord's claim is allowed, but without any costs
of a distress.
Upon the second question I am of opinion that the register, if
the assignee had paid the amount, would have been warranted in
allowing him credit for it in the audit of the account under the
27th seietion of the Act of Congress, at the second meeting of
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creditors. The allowance, as any other one, would then, of course,
have been subject to exception. But I am of opinion that a prospective payment could not have been regularly sanctioned by the
register unless there had been a special reference of the question
to him by the court. Even then his allowance would have been
subject to exception. In all cases, however, he may refer any
such question incidentally to .the court, as he has done in this
instance.
I understand that the questions here certified have arisen at a
second meeting of creditors. The sum of $125 will be deducted
Ijy the register from the net amount in the hands of the assignee
-after all proper charges have been allowed. The register's own
accoutnt will be settled with the assignee, and the excess or deficiency of the deposit of $50 accounted for between them. The
net amount will be reported for a dividend, after which the distribution of if will be reported according to form No. 32, appended
to the general order of the Supreme Court.
The remarks in the last paragraph are made in answer to
inquiries by the register in a letter to the clerk.
Recurring to the main point in question it may be added that
the Bankrupt Law of 1867, does not, in general, vest in the
assignee any more beneficial interest in the debtor's estate than
his execution-creditors could, under the laws of the respective
states already in force have obtained under adversary proceedings.
General conformity of procedure in thi*s respect in the Federal
courts, and in those of the several states, had been previously
attained through the Act of Congress of 19th May 1828 (4 St.
U. S. 281) and the rules and practice of the Federal courts
adopted from time to time, under the authority conferred by this
act. The system of bankruptcy Is, in a relative sense, uniform
throughout the United Stateswhen, it operates -uniformly upon
whatever would thus have been available to the recourse of execution-creditors if the bankrupt law had not been enacted. My
views to this effect have been explained in a former opinion. The
assignee in bankruptcy will, in the present case, obtain what
would have been obtainable for the benefit of an execution-creditor
under the law of Pennsylvania, That less or more may perhaps
be obtainable in another state does. not prevent the operation of
the bankrupt law from being, in a constitutional sense, uniform.

BAKER v. INSURANCE CO.

Superior Court of Cincinnati.
CHARLES K. BAKER v. THE CENTRAL INSURANCE COMPANY.
When a steamer is insured, while navigating the Western rivers, against the
usual risks, there is a warranty implied that the subject insured is a vessel of this
description, and will continue to be so during the existence of the policy.
If the owners subsequently transfer the machinery and wheels of the boat they
insured to another vessel, with the intention to abandon the hull for all purposes

of navigation, the hull is no longer at the risk of the underwriter.

Lincoln, Smith

TWrnock, for plaintiff in error.

Tilden, Stevenson & Tilden, for defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
STORER, J.-The plaintiff was insured by the defendants on
five-sixteenths of the steamer Sioux City, valued at $5000, against
the perils of the river or fire, by a policy issued on the 6th of
March 1865, the risk to continue until Mar6h 12th 1866. Permissiofi was given to navigate the Ohio and Mississippi rivers and
their tributaries, excepting the Arkansas and Red rivers, and
the premium agreed on was paid, or secured to be paid.
When the risk was taken it is admitted the boat was engaged
in navigating the Western waters, but it is alleged she was-lost
on the 16th of December 1865, while lying at St. Louis; being
then crushed and afterwards. sunk by the ice.
This action was brought by the assured for the loss, and the
case submitted to one of the Judges in Special Term, upon the
pleadings and evidence. The defendants, in their answer, admitted the loss of the boat, and the contract of'insurance, but denied
their liability, upon the facts which are more fully stated in the
testimony.
It appears that while the boat was at the wharf, in the early
part of November, her machinery, boilers, and wheels were taken
off and placed upon another hull owned by the insured, to which
they are permanently adjusted. They were, as the plaintiff testi.
fled, "transferred to the steamer Admiral to supply her with an
outfit, as the owners of the Sioux City had deemed it desirable to
build a lighter draught boat, more suitable to the trade, and
transfer her machinery and outfit into it ; disposing of the hull
and cabin of the Sioux City on the best terms they could."
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With -this evidence before him, the Judge decided that, under
the terms of the policy, the plaintiff could not recover. He held
that the description of the vessel, "the steamer Sioux City," was
a warranty that she was properly equipped and provided with
machinery, at the time the risk was taken, which warranty, in
legal contemplation, continued until the time had expired for
which the policy was issued; that when the machinery and wheels
were transferred to another boat, and had become part of her
outfit, the original hull to which they had been attached, having
been virtually abandoned, the contract of insurance was at an end.
I -To this ruling the plaintiff -excepted, and having filed his petition in error, now asks that the judgment in Special Term be
reversed.
The question before us may be resolved into a single proposition, and that is this: Do the words "steamer Sioux City," the
vessel then navigating the Western waters, import an express
warranty that she then is, and will continue to be until the time
:f loss, a steamer or a craft propelled by steam?
* There can be no just criticism on the words of description used
in the policy to change 'their ordinary signification; they cannot
be said to convey a different meaning than the term" steamboat,"
although until the last twenty years that name was universally
given to such vessels.. No particular form of. words, we suppose,
is required to constitute an express warranty; but it is admitted
that it is necessary they should be inserted in the body of the
policy, and must be such as clearly to'indicate the intention of
the parties: 1 Arnoula § 879.
In 1 Condy's Marshall. 314, it is said that "not only the name,
but also the species of the vessel ought truly to be described ; for
although The word ship, in its general signification, comprehends
every different species of vessel, both great and small, which
navigate the seas, yet in a policy of insurance the word ship is
used in contradistinction to dther vessels, and means a vessel
with three masts, and generally of large dimensions; and in such
case an underwriter would have a right to say he understod the
policy to be on a ship, and that he could not have .assureda sloop
or brig." (See also Meredith's Emerigon, oh. 2, § 7; oh..6, § 3.)
The definition of a warranty in a policy of insurance given
eighty years ago by Lord MANSFIELD, in D)e Hahn v. .Yartly,
1 T. R." 345, has been followed by Park, Marshall, Arnould,
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Phillips, Parsons, and Duer, and ii admitted to be the undisputed law.
His lordship decided "that a warranty in such an instrument
was a condition or a contingency, and unless that be performed
there is no contract." "It is perfectly immaterial," he says,
"for what purpose a warranty is introduced.; but being inserted,
the contract does not exist unleds it is literally complied with."
"It is in the nature of a condition precedent; either affirmative,
as where the insured undertakes for the truth of some' positive
allegation; or promissory, when the insured undertakes-to perform
some executory stipulation:" 1 Marshall on Insurance 347.
"Whenever, then' the warranty exists, whether the thing to
be done is essential to the security of the ship or not, or whether
the loss happens or does not happen on account of the- breach of
the warranty, still the insured has no remedy. He has not performed his part of the contract, and if he did not mean to perform
it he ought not to have bound' himself- by such a condition:"
Park on Insurance 318.
"Express warranties include those
stipulations which, by the agreement of the parties, are introduced
into the policy; as that the property is neuftral; that the vessel
has a certain national character-English, French, or American;
that she is, if in time of war, to sail with convoy; that she has
an armament of a certain number of guns, or is manned by so
many seamei: In all these cases the contract must be literally,
fulfilled, for it is said the very meaning of a warranty is to preclude all question whether it has been substantially complied
with or not; if it is affirmative, it must be literally true; if promissory, it must be strictly performed :" 1 Marshall 848. We
find no limitation to the rule thus stated, in any reported case in
our courts, whether Federal or state, nor in any American writer
on the subject of insurance.
It is claimed by the plaintiff, if the terms used in the policy
may be regarded as an express warranty, that it is not a continuig stipulation that, at the time of loss, the vessel must be the
same she was represented to be when the risk was taken. Indeed,
it is said by counsel, that, while any portion of the subject insured
remains, it is still covered.
If this was true, the machinery would still be insured if the
vessel was abandoned or broken up; for, if the mere hull and
cabin are covered, notwithstanding, for all the purpose of naviga
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tion, the steamer no longer exists ; there can be no good reason
why her propelling power-her wheels and other appurtenances
-would. not come under the same rule..
But this view of the contract we are satisfied cannot be sustained on any legal principle ; for whenever the description of the
subject insured no longer existed, there must necessarily be- an
end to the contract.
The risk was taken originally, not upon the hull of a vessel, but
upon the vessel fitted out, let it .be a ship or a steamboat ; and
whenever either ceases to retain the specific character, either by
the removal of the masts, rigging, sails, and furniture of the one,
or the machinery of the other, the policy cannot longer be- said to
attach; if it did, the underwriter would be bound by a risk to
which he never gave his assent. He might be willing to insure
the contemplated vessel ready for navigation, when he would not
have given a'policy on the hull, and, as he might have ,refused.
such a risk in the first instance, he ought not, when the original
character of the thing insured is entirely changed, to be charged
with a liability he never contemplated, or could reasonably be
supposed to have assumed..
It was well remarked by Lord Eumo, in the .Netwcast e Fire _Thsurance Company.v. Macnamara et-al., 8 Dow 362-865, " that
if there is a warranty, it is part of the contract that the matter is
such as it is represented to be.
"Therefore, the materiality or immateriality signifies nothing;
the only question is-what is the building de facto I have insured "
In Sellim et al. v. TPornton, 3 Ellis & Black.'868, reported
also in 26 E. L.. & Eq. 288, Lord CAMPBELL held, " that when
a two-story brick building, described in the pQlicy as used for a
dwelling-house and store, was insured for a year, it amounted to
a warranty that the insured w6uld nbt -do anything to make the
condition of the premises vary from the description ; and if,
durifig the risk, the insured added another story, and the property
was afterwards burned, there- was a breach of- the warranty by
the addition to the premises, and the underwriters were discharged."'
"The description," said his lordship, "is evidently the basis
of the contract, and is furnished to the underwriter to eiiab!e
him to determitie whether he will" agree to take the ri3k at all.
and if he does take it, what premium hp shall demand.
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"With respect to maritime policies, if there is a warranty of
neutrality, or any other matter which continues of importance
till the risk determines, whether the policy be for a voyage or for
a time certain, such warranty is continuous ; and if broken, the
underwriter is released." See also 'Taylor v. NS. TV. Ins. Co.,
2 Oiurtis 0. 0. U. S. 612 ; Calvert v. Ham. Hut. Ins. Co., 1
Allen 308 ; Yowler v. Etna Ins. Co., 6 Cowen. 673 ; Wood,
v. Hartford F-re Ins. Co., 13 Conn. 544; Sheldon v.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 21 Conn. 19.
We do not deny that in case of accident, or when a vesdel is
in port for repairs, the -machinery, in whole or in part, may be
reioved from the vessel for that purpose, to be replaced within
a reasonable time. This was settled in Polly v. Royal Ezchange'
Co., 1 Burr. 341, and this exception to the general rule may well
be said to prove its existence.
We have been referred by counsel to various cases which he'
claims furnish analogies by which we may fairly construe the
contract between the parties to include the loss of the hull by
ice, but we find none of them to deny the principle upon which
the law of warranty is founded; but, on the contrary, sustain the
view we have taken. They are quoted, we suppose, to prove
that in a proper case we may look to the fact whether the omission
to do an act that might have been done, has produced the loss ;
but it is very'clear that whatever may be the rule where a representation only has been made, the increase or diminution of the
risk has nothing to do with an expresi warranty; in the latter
case, ita scripta est determines the righti of the parties. We
would remind counsel that the case cited of Hood v. Manhattan
Insurance Co., 2 Duer 181, was some years since reversed by
a unanimous decision of the C6urt of Appeals, 1 Kernan 532.
We conclude the defendants are not liable on this policy to
indemnify the plaintiff for the loss of the hull and cabin of his
boat. The whole testimony proves the subject insured no longer
existed when a material part fiad been taken away; and the
opinion of the witness as to what constituted a steamboat, or what
efforts were made to prevent the accident, cannot be regarded as
affecting the settled law of insurance. Their opinions are as
various as the cases in which they are presented, and are effectually disposed of by the ruling of our Supreme Court, in Hartford
Protection Insurance Co. v. Harmer, 2 Ohio State Reports

